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RECENT DECISIONS
subject matter submitted was not made. Under this section arbi-
trators were required to complete the award by naming the amount
each reinstated employee should receive, for without this the
award is not considered final. In re E. A. Laboratories Inc., 50
N. Y. S. 2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1944). In Matter of Pfeiffo, 222 App.
Div. 62, 225 N. Y. Supp. 294 (1st Dep't 1922), the award was va-
cated and remitted to the arbitrator for a final determination of
the quality of the product before the award would be enforced.
As this case exemplifies, the conflict between labor arbitration
awards and enforcement by strict judicial review constitutes a bar
to successful arbitration of labor disputes. If the advantages of
labor arbitration are to be enjoyed to the fullest extent, it is im-
portant that the courts ungrudgingly acknowledge the authority
of labor arbitration boards within their delineated area.
Myron Siegel
INCOME TAX-EXTORTED FUNDS HELD
TAXABLE INCOME
Taxpayer was convicted of willfully attempting to evade fed-
eral income tax by failing to report cash obtained by extortion.
Held (5-4): Extorted funds are taxable income under.Int. Rev.
Code § 22(a). Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130 (1952).
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927), established the
basic principle that the unlawful character of a transaction is no
reason to exempt it from a tax which would be imposed if it were
lawful. Later cases also establish this conclusion by the use of
one or more of the following bases for generally holding disputed
gains to be taxable income:
(1) Tax. liability has been based on the enjoyment *of the
economic benefits of, or on the actual control over, the property,
regardless of where title technically lay. Corliss v. Bowers, 281
U. S. 376 at 378 (1930); Burnet v. Wells, 289 UT. S. 670 at 678
(1933) ; Plato v. Commissioner, 195 F. 2d 580 at 582 (5th Cir. 1952).
(2) Taxability has rested on the'receipt of earnings under a
claim of right and without restriction as to their disposition. North
American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417 at 424 (1932) ; United States
v. Lewis, 34,0 U. S. 590 at 591 (1951); National City Bank of New
York v. Helvering, 98 F. 2d 93 at 96 (2d Cir. 1938).
(3) Some gains have been held taxable through the interpre-
tation of the legislative history of Int. Rev. Code § 22(a). The
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, c. 16, § II B, 38 STAT. 167 (1913), provided,
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"(I)ncome of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and
income . . . from . . the transaction of any lawful business car-
ried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever . . ." (Ital. added). The Revenue Act
of 1916, § 2a, 39 STAT. 757 (1916), was a reenactment of this provi-
sion, omitting only the word lawful. This latter section is in all
material respects identical with § 22(a) of the present Internal
Revenue Code. The single omission is a strong indication of a
legislative intent to tax the gains, profits, and income from any
unlawful activity as well as from any lawful one. United States v.
Sullivan, supra. It has also been stated that "the broad sweep of
this language indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full
measure of its taxing power within those definable categories."
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 at 334 (1940).
(4) Gains have been held taxable by the use of analogies to
other unlawful, but taxable, activities, including: illegal sale of
liquor, United States v. Sullivan, supra; ransom payments to a
kidnapper and protection payments, Humphreys v. Commissioner,
42 B. T. A. 857 (1940), aff'd, 125 F. 2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U. S. 637 (1942); graft, Chadick- v. United States, 77
F. 2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 609 (1935);
bribes, United States v. Commerford, 64 F. 2d 28 (2d Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 289 U. S. 759 (1933); kickbacks, Caldwell v. Comnmis-
sioner, 135 F. 2d 488 (5th Cir. 1.943); lotteries, Christian H. Droge,
35 B. T. A. 829 (1937); illegal prize fight pictures, George L. Ric7-
ard, 15 B. T. A. 316 (1929); race track bookmaking, James P.
McKenna, 1 B. T. A. 326 (1925); and various other illegal enter-
prises, Robert L. Carnahan, 9 T. C. 1206 (1947), aff'd sub nom.
Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F. 2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949).
Prior to the principal case, the leading case was Commissioner
v. Wilcox, 327 U. S. 404 (1946), holding that embezzled funds do not
constitute taxable income. The Court stafed, at 408:
(A) taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a
claim of right to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a
definite, unconditional obligation to repay or return that which
would otherwise constitute a gain. Without some bona fide
legal or equitable claim, even though it be contingent or con-
tested in nature, the taxpayer cannot be said to have received
any gain or profit within the reach of § 22(a).
The conclusion of non-taxability followed on the ground that, in
the opinion of the Court, neither of these conditions is present in
embezzlement.
Even before the principal case, however, the courts showed
dissatisfaction with the Wilcox case and resorted to technical dis-
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tinctions in order to hold unlawful gains taxable. Swindled money
was held taxable on the ground that a state law gave the swindler
title, although only a voidable one, to the unlawful gain. Akers v.
Scofield, 167 F. 2d 718 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 823
(1948). It has been stated that extorted funds are properly tax-
able, even though the payors might later be able to recover the
funds extorted from them. Estate of Joseph Nitto, 13 T. 0. 858
at 867 (1949). Even fact situations bordering on embezzlement
have given rise to tax liability. United States v. Currier T~mrber
Co., 70 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1947), aff'd, 166 F. 2d 346 (1st Cir.
1948); United States v. lozia, 104 F. Supp. 846 (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
Finally, in the principal case, Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for
the majority, avoided the Wilcox case by narrowly limiting it to its
facts, without discussing the criteria it set up to determine taxable
gains. He rested his decision on several grounds: (1) the extor-
tioner's complete dominion over the cash, in the absence of his
victim's unlikely demand for its return, gives him the free use and
economic benefit of it, and (2) the legislative history of Int. Rev.
Code § 22(a) demonstrates an intent to tax unlawful as well as
lawful gains.
Since the Rutin case, the trend has been toward its reasoning
and away from the test set up by the Wilcox decision. This may
be illustrated by two recent Tax Court cases. In Henry C. Boucher,
18 T. 0. No. 85 (June 30, 1952), profits were held taxable which
were obtained through a manipulation of the employer's books,
causing him to make overpayments which were appropriated by
employees. W. L. Kann, 18 T. C. No. 131 (Sept. 18, 1952), held
taxable, funds misappropriated from a corporation of which peti-
tioners were in complete control. Although both cases were clearly
embezzlement-type situations, the courts again limited the Wilcox
case "to its facts" and proceeded to hold the unlawful gains tax-
able on the authority of the 
instant case.
Admittedly, it seems inequitable to petitioner to change the
law in the midst of a criminal proceeding. Perhaps that fact ac-
counts for the Court's reluctance expressly to overrule the IFd!,oox
case. However, an analysis of the instant case leads to the prob-
able conclusion that, in effect, it does overrule the Wilcox decision.
This is for the best, since the Wilcox test does not lend itself eaSil-
to a practical administration of taxation, being dependent upon
refinements of title. The question of title might be affected by
varying state laws, thus leading to inconsistent tax results in sim-
ilar fact situations. The Wilcox test also puts the wrongdoer in a
position to profit by his own wrong by using his crime as a bar to
taxation. A better test, applicable to unlawful as well as lawful
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
gains, appears to be that of the principal case, which taxes the
gain in the hands of the person who has the freedom to dispose of
it and who derives a "readily realizable economic value from it."
Jerome D. Adner
INCOME TAX-COSTS IN VIOLATION OF CEILING PRICES
HELD DEDUCTIBLE
In their income tax returns, taxpayers included amounts paid
in excess of World War II ceiling prices in computing their deduc-
tions for cost of goods sold. These over-ceiling payments were
disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. In the first
appellate rulings on the question three Circuit Courts held that in
the absence of legislation to the contrary, such payments are de-
ductible from gross receipts as a part of the cost of goods sold, in
determining gross income. Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F. 2d
221 (1st Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile, rnc., 197
F. 2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Commissioner v. Guminski, 198 F. 2d 265
(5th Cir. 1952).
An income tax, levied by Congress under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, in order to be valid, must be based only
upon income, and if other than income is used as the bais for such
a tax it is a direct tax requiring apportionment under Art. I § 9
of the Constitution. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
No income from business operations can be realized until the cost
of goods sold has been recovered, and therefore an income tax can-
not reach receipts from which that cost has not been subtracted.
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179 (1918); Sullenger, 11
T. C. 1076 (1948). Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code
§ 22 (a), and U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-5 (1943), provided
that the cost of goods sold should be offset against gross receipts
in determining gross income from business for income tax pur-
poses.
Considering the constitutional limitations of the Sixteenth
Amendment alone, it is clear that Congress could not pass an
income tax disallowing the deduction from gross receipts of any
part of the cost of goods sold. However, such an otherwise un-
constitutional exercise of the taxing power may be found valid
when applied as incident to some other power of Congress. Thus,
if the tax is an expedient regulation of commerce by Congress,
and the end to be attained is one falling within the commerce
power, then the tax is not void, although within a loose and more
extended sense than was used in the Constitution it was called a
162
